🔒 Harden GitHub Actions: pin actions to SHAs and disable persisted checkout credentials#7033
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compwron wants to merge 1 commit into
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🔒 Harden GitHub Actions: pin actions to SHAs and disable persisted checkout credentials#7033compwron wants to merge 1 commit into
compwron wants to merge 1 commit into
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…eckout credentials Hardens the CI/automation workflow supply chain by: - Pinning every third-party action to an immutable commit SHA (with a trailing version comment for readability) across all workflows in .github/workflows/ - Setting `persist-credentials: false` on all actions/checkout steps so later run steps and third-party actions do not inherit the repo token No runtime behavior change is expected beyond the hardening above. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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What changed, and why?
Hardens the workflow supply chain across
.github/workflows/by:persist-credentials: falseon allactions/checkoutsteps, so later run steps and third-party actions in the same job don't inherit the repo token.This follows the GitHub-recommended supply-chain hardening guidance (pin actions by full-length commit SHA) and applies it repo-wide.
Pinned SHAs:
actions/checkout@9f698171ed81b15d1823a05fc7211befd50c8ae0(# v6.0.3)actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e(# v6)actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c(# v8)actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a(# v7)actions/github-script@373c709c69115d41ff229c7e5df9f8788daa9553(# v9)actions/labeler@8558fd74291d67161a8a78ce36a881fa63b766a9(# v5)actions/stale@5bef64f19d7facfb25b37b414482c7164d639639(# v9)github/codeql-action@f52b05f4acaaa234e44466e66d29050e135ea9ef(# v4.36.0) — init/autobuild/analyzeruby/setup-ruby@9eb537ca036ebaed86729dcb9309076e4c5c3b74(# v1)qltysh/qlty-action/coverage@a19242102d17e497f437d7466aa01b528537e899(# v2.2.0)test-summary/action@37b508cfee6d4d080eedd00b5bb240a6a784a6a5(# v2)ibiqlik/action-yamllint@ae1abb2821b567e96742aa776f7b62c9b6a26bc8(# v3)technote-space/toc-generator@ce21845a0177fd1288cada589dd4efd2e46a27ca(# v4)dessant/issue-states@a1bd84606ef48dca24ce24140e068516a74b3e0b(# v3)andymckay/labeler@e6c4322d0397f3240f0e7e30a33b5c5df2d39e90(# 1.0.4)Firelemons/on-deploy@852d81d797e1e230da7617a3e3784971fda7a047(# v2.2.1)bjthompson805/move-issues@ced196f41b6124cc51ea64bdd43587527a457624(# v1)rubyforgood/add-label-to-cards@62e1346cb6a1837c82e1c2919562d54dd2893ddf(# v3.3)rubyforgood/remove-label-from-cards@186f170a25e437b6b172a4f274d2492dd14bfb4e(# 2.0)rubyforgood/unassign-issues@f3d8461c2a3ea67cc4a015ca50737a4f865460d7(# v1.3)How is this tested?
Validated that all
.github/workflows/*.ymlfiles still parse as valid YAML and that everyuses:reference is pinned to a 40-char commit SHA. No runtime behavior change is expected beyond the hardening described above — each SHA corresponds to the exact tag already in use.What are the risks / what can go wrong?
Low risk. These jobs only need the checked-out files and do not rely on a persisted checkout token for subsequent steps. Pins point to the same released versions previously referenced by tag.
Screenshots please for UI-changing code 🎨
N/A — workflow-only change.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code