fix: skip authorise() for AUTHENTICATED/PUBLIC sentinels in WebSocket mux#972
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The mux unconditionally called auth.authorise() for every operation,
passing capability sentinels like AUTHENTICATED ("__authenticated__")
to the IAM regime. Since no role grants "__authenticated__", the regime
denied the request — breaking whoami (and any future AUTHENTICATED-only
operation) over the WebSocket path while the HTTP endpoints worked fine.
Match the guard pattern used by iam_endpoint.py and registry_endpoint.py:
only call authorise() for real capability strings, not sentinels.
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The mux unconditionally called auth.authorise() for every operation, passing capability sentinels like AUTHENTICATED ("authenticated") to the IAM regime. Since no role grants "authenticated", the regime denied the request — breaking whoami (and any future AUTHENTICATED-only operation) over the WebSocket path while the HTTP endpoints worked fine.
Match the guard pattern used by iam_endpoint.py and registry_endpoint.py: only call authorise() for real capability strings, not sentinels.