Security fixes are applied to the tip of main (no release has been tagged yet; once 1.x releases exist, fixes will target the latest released 1.x line). Older pre-1.0 snapshots are not maintained.

Please report security issues privately — do not open a public issue or PR for an unfixed vulnerability.

• Email development @ waldiez.io, or
• Use GitHub's private "Report a vulnerability" advisory flow.

Please include, where possible: affected implementation(s) and version, a description of the issue and its impact, and minimal steps or a proof of concept to reproduce.

• Acknowledgement: within 3 business days.
• Initial assessment: within 7 business days.
• We will coordinate a fix and a disclosure timeline with you, and credit you in the release notes unless you prefer to remain anonymous. Please allow us a reasonable window to ship a fix before any public disclosure.

• Secrets on the command line. Every implementation accepts the w-otp secret inline as KEY=<secret>, which makes it visible via ps//proc to other processes of the same user — switching languages does not avoid this. To keep the secret out of process arguments, pass a file path instead (KEY=<path>): all implementations read the key material from the file. The sh implementation additionally re-exposes an inline secret to openssl(1) as a process argument. See the "Security considerations" section of spec/CRYPTO_SPEC.md.
• KEY path/secret ambiguity. KEY=<value> is treated as a file path if a file with that exact name exists, and as the literal secret otherwise — uniformly in all implementations. An inline secret that happens to match an existing filename will silently be replaced by that file's contents. Prefer the explicit file form for anything beyond ad-hoc use.
• WIDs embed timestamps in cleartext. This is by design (sortability), but it means any party that sees a WID learns when it was minted, a WID-keyed SQL table reveals row creation times to anyone who can read it, and HLC-WIDs additionally name the minting node. Do not use raw WIDs as identifiers for people or other privacy-sensitive entities; see "Privacy Considerations" in spec/SPEC.md.
• w-otp is a truncated MAC, not a rotating OTP. Verifiers must apply rate-limiting/lockout and (if needed) single-use tracking; see spec/CRYPTO_SPEC.md.