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10 changes: 9 additions & 1 deletion .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -42,7 +42,15 @@ jobs:
name: Secrets + content policy
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@93cb6efe18208431cddfb8368fd83d5badbf9bfd # v5.0.1
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0

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🔍 Checkout pin bumped only in this workflow; rest of repo still on v4 / floating tags

This is now the only workflow pinned to a v7 commit SHA; .github/workflows/_checks.yml pins v4.3.1 by SHA and ~10 other workflows (e.g. .github/workflows/publish-npm.yml:30, .github/workflows/test-go.yml:31) still use the mutable actions/checkout@v4 tag without persist-credentials: false. If the intent is supply-chain hardening (zizmor artipacked), the same treatment is missing across those workflows, several of which are publish jobs with elevated permissions.

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🔍 Pinned commit SHA for v7.0.0 should be verified against upstream

The pin 9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0 cannot be validated from the repo contents. Since this workflow is the repository's security gate, confirm the SHA actually corresponds to the actions/checkout v7.0.0 tag upstream — a wrong SHA either fails the job outright or silently runs a different revision than the comment claims.

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with:
# Checkout defaults to persisting the job token for later steps: since v6 it
# lives in a file under $RUNNER_TEMP referenced from .git/config, no longer in
# .git/config itself. It is still a live credential in the job, and this job
# downloads a third-party binary (gitleaks, below) and runs it over the whole
# tree. Nothing here pushes -- the scan is `--no-git` over the working tree --
# so no step needs authenticated Git; drop it. (zizmor: artipacked)
persist-credentials: false

# gitleaks' GitHub Action requires a paid license for organizations; the CLI
# itself is MIT-licensed and free. Pin the version AND verify the release
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