RepoPilot automatically permits:

• read Issue and Workflow context;
• clone/fetch an allowed repository;
• create a branch and commit;
• push a non-protected branch;
• create a Pull Request;
• read CI and write evidence.

RepoPilot requires human approval for:

• merge Pull Request;
• delete branch;
• destructive rollback;
• permission changes;
• secret changes;
• arbitrary high-risk tools.

1. Worker calls repopilot_request_approval.
2. Control plane stores status=pending, version=1.
3. Authenticated human approves/rejects with expectedVersion.
4. Approval version increments.
5. High-risk MCP tool atomically sets consumed_at.
6. Reusing the approval fails.

The action itself is recorded as evidence with approval ID and version.

• No credential is stored in source code or PostgreSQL.
• Model and MCP credentials should remain in Higress/AgentTeams.
• Local development uses .env, ignored by Git.
• Production should use Kubernetes Secrets or an external secret manager.
• Worker prompts and evidence must redact credential-shaped strings.

GITHUB_ALLOWED_REPOSITORIES is enforced by:

• REST Run creation;
• GitHub Webhook;
• every GitHub MCP tool.

• Raw-body HMAC-SHA256 verification.
• Constant-time digest comparison.
• Delivery ID deduplication under a transaction-level advisory lock.
• Non-actionable events are accepted but not executed.

• Canonical JSON prevents key-order hash drift.
• Each record links to previousHash.
• Database triggers reject updates and deletes.
• Console recomputes chain validity through the API.

This provides tamper evidence, not a substitute for database access control or external timestamping.

• Put OIDC/SSO before REST and console.
• Replace X-RepoPilot-Actor trust with proxy-verified identity.
• Use a GitHub App with least-privilege installation scopes.
• Add network policies and TLS.
• Add approval expiry and reviewer groups.
• Export evidence chain roots to immutable object storage.