ci: prevent script injection via github.head_ref in gendoc-docs - #315
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github.head_ref is the pull request's branch name and is controllable by the PR author. Expanding it directly into the `run:` script let a crafted branch name inject shell commands into the "Commit the regenerated catalog" step (OSSF Scorecard "Dangerous-Workflow", the only code-level code-scanning alert). Route it through an environment variable and reference it quoted, so the shell -- not the Actions template engine -- handles the branch name as data. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Kwid3AAwhHZQzCEGSoYdPY
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enabled auto-merge
July 27, 2026 10:42
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Summary
Fixes the one code-level alert on the code-scanning dashboard: the OSSF Scorecard
Dangerous-Workflow finding in
gendoc-docs.yml. The workflow expanded${{ github.head_ref }}— the PR author's branch name, an attacker-controllablevalue — directly into a
run:shell script, allowing shell-command injection via acrafted branch name. The value is now routed through an environment variable and
referenced quoted, so the shell handles it as data rather than the Actions template
engine splicing it into the script text.
Type of change
Changes
gendoc-docs.yml— in the "Commit the regenerated catalog to this branch" step,bind
github.head_refto aHEAD_REFenvironment variable and change the push togit push origin "HEAD:$HEAD_REF"(wasgit push origin HEAD:${{ github.head_ref }}).ref: ${{ github.head_ref }}on theactions/checkoutstep is anaction input (not shell), so it is not an injection vector and is left unchanged —
consistent with Scorecard flagging only the
run:usage.Testing
dotnet build FirstClassErrors.sln— not run (no application code changed)dotnet test FirstClassErrors.sln— not run (no application code changed)yaml.safe_load) and confirmed nountrusted context remains in any
run:block.tools/commit-lint/lint-commit-message.sh --ci.Documentation
Architecture decisions
Related issues
None — addresses an OSSF Scorecard code-scanning alert; no tracking issue exists.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01Kwid3AAwhHZQzCEGSoYdPY
Generated by Claude Code