V7 subsystem#7
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July 11, 2021 02:26
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maxzhen
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leaf driver IDs are still hard-coded?
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| ret = xrt_drv_get(did); | ||
| if (ret) { | ||
| request_module("xrt:d%08X", did); | ||
| ret = xrt_drv_get(did); | ||
| } |
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can we just blindly call request_module(), then xrt_drv_get()? is there any unwanted side effect if we call request_module() when the module has already been loaded? or even hide request_module() inside xrt_drv_get()?
| data->xdrv = xdrv; | ||
| if (xdrv->driver.owner && xdrv->driver.owner != THIS_MODULE) { | ||
| if (try_module_get(xdrv->driver.owner)) | ||
| *(int *)data->arg = 0; |
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if try_module_get() failed, do we want to return some error code through data->arg?
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Jul 13, 2021
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houlz0507
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Oct 7, 2022
The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6 Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations (e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into skb_shared_info: Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 208 memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen); (gdb) bt #0 seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 #1 0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>, family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731 Xilinx#2 0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775 Xilinx#3 genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792 Xilinx#4 0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501 Xilinx#5 0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803 Xilinx#6 0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 Xilinx#7 netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 Xilinx#8 0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 ... (gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end $1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p/x secret $2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p slen $3 = 64 '@' The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of SECRET. Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang.tw@gmail.com> Tested: verified that EINVAL is correctly returned when secretlen > len(secret) Fixes: 4f4853d ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure") Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
houlz0507
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Oct 7, 2022
…loc() The voice allocator sometimes begins allocating from near the end of the array and then wraps around, however snd_emu10k1_pcm_channel_alloc() accesses the newly allocated voices as if it never wrapped around. This results in out of bounds access if the first voice has a high enough index so that first_voice + requested_voice_count > NUM_G (64). The more voices are requested, the more likely it is for this to occur. This was initially discovered using PipeWire, however it can be reproduced by calling aplay multiple times with 16 channels: aplay -r 48000 -D plughw:CARD=Live,DEV=3 -c 16 /dev/zero UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in sound/pci/emu10k1/emupcm.c:127:40 index 65 is out of range for type 'snd_emu10k1_voice [64]' CPU: 1 PID: 31977 Comm: aplay Tainted: G W IOE 6.0.0-rc2-emu10k1+ Xilinx#7 Hardware name: ASUSTEK COMPUTER INC P5W DH Deluxe/P5W DH Deluxe, BIOS 3002 07/22/2010 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 dump_stack+0x10/0x16 ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x3f __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49 snd_emu10k1_playback_hw_params+0x3bc/0x420 [snd_emu10k1] snd_pcm_hw_params+0x29f/0x600 [snd_pcm] snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x188/0x1410 [snd_pcm] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x35/0x170 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x50 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x35/0x170 snd_pcm_ioctl+0x27/0x40 [snd_pcm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Signed-off-by: Tasos Sahanidis <tasos@tasossah.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3707dcab-320a-62ff-63c0-73fc201ef756@tasossah.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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