feature: EST Rotate - Inclusive E/KU Check; - #83
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doanac
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Aug 13, 2026
| @@ -189,18 +189,20 @@ func verifyNewCert(curCert, newCert *x509.Certificate) error { | |||
| if !bytes.Equal(curCert.RawSubject, newCert.RawSubject) { | |||
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Github does not allow you to comment on commit messages. However, the commit needs a couple things:
- A Signed-off-by
- A description of the change. Your PR header is good - you could just use that content in the commit message
Our security engineer is on holiday this week. When he gets back, we'll have him take a close look.
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Pardon my commit etiquette. Fixed! :)
Let's wait for the security engineer then, thanks!
Signed-off-by: Tymur Hulua <tymur.hulua@goldbeck.de>
This commit updates the Key Usage and Extended Key Usage validation for EST-submitted certificates. Instead of requiring Digital Signature on KU and TLS Web Client Authentication on EKU to be the only present usages, the check now verifies that they are included among the others.
This change allows EST servers to extend CSRs with additional usages, such as `keyCertSign`, `cRLSign`, or `codeSigning`, without failing validation.
E.G:
The following certificate would have been rejected in the past, but is now accepted:
```
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
TLS Web Client Authentication, Code Signing
```
And the following certificate would have been rejected in the past and remains rejected now:
```
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
Code Signing
```
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Hey out there!
This PR updates the Key Usage and Extended Key Usage validation for EST-submitted certificates. Instead of requiring Digital Signature on KU and TLS Web Client Authentication on EKU to be the only present usages, the check now verifies that they are included among the others.
This change allows EST servers to extend CSRs with additional usages, such as
keyCertSign,cRLSign, orcodeSigning, without failing validation.E.G:
The following certificate would have been rejected in the past, but is now accepted:
And the following certificate would have been rejected in the past and remains rejected now: